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CORPORATIONS - CUMULATIVE VoTING, CLASSIFIED BOARDS AND 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION - In two recent decisions, Wolf-
son v. Avery1 and Janney v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.,2 a 
constitutional provision3 guaranteeing to every corporate share-
holder the right to cumulate4 his votes in an election of directors 
was construed in light of a statute5 authorizing the classification 
1 6 III. (2d) 78, 126 N.E. (2d) 701 (1955). The Wolfson case was one of first impression 
in Illinois, and indeed in the entire country, and merited considerable comment in the 
press and discussion in legal periodicals. See, e.g., 8 ALA. L. REv. 368 (1956); 22 UNIV. 
CHI. L. R.Ev. 751 (1955); Shafer, "The Conflict of Cumulative Voting and Staggered Direc-
torships," 24 UNIV. CIN. L. R.Ev. 560 (1955); 60 DICK. L. REv. 185 (1956); 69 HARv. L. 
R.Ev. 380 (1955); 43 ILL. B. J. 807 (1955); 1955 UNIV. !LL. L. FORUM 316; 7 MERCER L. REv. 
227 (1955); 9 MIAMI L.Q. 365 (1955); Stephan, "Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: 
Some Reflections on Wolfson v~very," 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 351 (1956); 50 N.W. 
UNIV. L. R.Ev. II2 (1955); 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 822 (1955); Sell and Fuge, "Impact of 
Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting," 17 
UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956); 30 ST. JOHNS L. R.Ev. 83 (1955); 41 VA. L. REv. 809 (1955); 
l WAYNE L. R.Ev. 217 (1955). 
2 387 Pa. 282, 128 A. (2d) 76 (1956). The lower court decision is noted in 30 TEMP. 
L. Q. 64 (1956). 
3 !LL. CoNST., art. II, §3: " ••• [I]n all elections for directors or managers of incor-
porated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote .•• for the number 
of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers 
to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the 
number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to 
distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit. 
... " PA. CONST., art. 16, §4: "In all elections for directors or managers of a corporation 
each member or shareholder may cast the whole number of his votes for one candidate, 
or distribute them upon nvo or more candidates, as he may prefer." 
4 Cumulative voting entitles a shareholder to votes equal to the number of his 
shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The percentage of voting 
shares needed to elect X directors = (the percentage of outstanding shares voting, multi-
plied by X) + (the number of directors being elected, plus one). WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE 
VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 41 (1951). See also Leckemby, "Classification of Directors and Its 
Effect Upon Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections," 56 DICK. L. R.Ev. 330 (1952). 
0 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §157.35: "When the board of directors shall consist of 
nine or more members, in lieu of electing the whole number of directors annually, the 
by-laws may provide that the directors be divided into either nvo or three classes, each 
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of directors and the election of only one class annually. In both, 
it was argued by a minority shareholder that the constitutional 
provision guaranteed him representation on the board propor-
tional to his stock holdings, and that the classification statute, 
authorizing a reduction of the number of directors to be elected 
at each election, required a greater number of share votes to elect 
a single director and thereby impaired his constitutional right 
to proportional representation on the ·board. The Wolf son case 
accepted the shareholder's argument; the Janney case rejected it. 
The decisions indicate a fundamental difference in interpreta-
tion of the constitutional provision for cumulative voting: Was 
such a provision intended to assure the minority proportional rep-
resentation on the board, 6 or only to enable a sufficient minority 
to secure some representation?7 If the former, then a classification 
statute would be beyond the power of the legislature, 8 since it 
would defeat proportional representation by requiring a greater 
number of share votes to elect a single director.9 If the latter, the 
classification statute would be valid, since it would not negate the 
minority's right to cumulate, but only limit the effective exercise 
of that right.10 The intent of the constitutional framers can best 
be discovered by a consideration of the language of the constitu-
class to be as nearly equal in number as possible .... " Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) 
tit. 15, §48: "Whenever the stockholders of any corporation .•• decide, by a majority 
vote of those present .•. to elect a portion of their directors for a term or terms longer 
than one year, it may and shall be lawful for such corporation, at the next ensuing elec-
tion, to divide the directors or managers, which are to be chosen, into two, three or four 
classes .... " Defendant corporation in the Janney case, subject to the supervision of 
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, was outside the reach of the Business 
Corporation Law, which, however, contained a similar provision. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
1957 Supp.) tit. 15, §2852-403. 
6 See generally Stephan, "Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: Some Reflections 
on Wolfson v. Avery," 31 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 351 (1956); 30 TEMP. L. Q. 64 (1956); 
Young, "The Case for Cumulative Voting," 1950 WIS. L. REV. 49. 
7 See generally Garrett, "Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis," 
51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 310 (1956); Sell and Fuge, "Impact of Classified Corporate Direc-
torates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting," 17 UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 151 
(1956); Axley, "The Case Against Cumulative Voting,'' 1950 WIS. L. REv. 278. 
8 The Illinois and Pennsylvania state constitutions are a limitation on the power of 
the legislature. People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E. (2d) 761 (1950); Commonwealth v. 
Keiser, 340 Pa. 59, 16 A. (2d) 307 (1940). 
9 In the Wolfson case, where a nine-director board was classified into three classes, 
it was undisputed that it would require 250% as many votes to elect a director in a 
three-director election as would be necessary if all nine directors were to be elected at 
the same time. In the Janney case, where sixteen elected directors were classified into 
two classes, the percentage was approximately 190%. See note 4 supra. 
10 " ••• [T]he Constitutional provision ... grants the right of cumulative voting 
but it does not purport to insure the maximum effectiveness of the exercise of that right 
to obtain minority representation on the board of directors." Janney v. Philadelphia 
Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282 at 288, 128 A. (2d) 76 (1956). 
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tional provisions themselves in context, or, should the language 
be ambiguous, by indications of intent given by extrinsic evi-
dence. Consideration will initially be given to the incidence of 
cumulative voting and classification in the United States. 
I. Incidence of Cumulative Voting and Classification 
Cumulative voting for corporate directors, a device unknown 
to the common law,11 is a comparatively recent constitutional and 
legislative innovation.12 It had its origin in the excesses of corpo-
rate management in the latter half of the nineteenth century,13 
and was designed to enable minority shareholders to gain repre-
sentation on the board of directors.14 Provisions for cumulative 
voting took one of two forms. The mandatory provision guaran-
teed the right of cumulative voting to the shareholder regardless 
of any provision to the contrary in the corporate charter or by-
laws.15 Such a right is provided in the constitutions of thirteen 
11 At common law, the majority, under straight voting, elected every member of the 
board. In re Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 469, 179 A. 128 (1934); Commonwealth ex rel. O'Shea 
v. Flannery, 203 Pa. 28, 52 A. 129 (1902); State v. Perham, 30 Wash. (2d) 368, 191 P. 
(2d) 689 (1948). Cf. In re Jamaica Consumers' Ice Co., 190 App. Div. 739, 180 N.Y.S. 
384, affd. 229 N.Y. 516, 129 N.E. 897 (1920). 
12 The idea of cumulative voting for corporate directors was first articulated in the 
Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1870. "WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIREC-
TORS 20, 34 (1951). 
13 Receiving widespread publicity during this period were the operations of Messrs. 
Drew, Fisk and Gould in the Erie Railroad. See generally Campbell, "The Origin and 
Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors," 10 BUSINESS LAWYER, No. 3, p. 3 (1955); 
WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIREcrORS 21 (1951). 
14 "The remainder of the stockholders are in the dark. They have nobody in the 
board to watch their interests, to protect against waste, extravagance or mismanagement, 
or to take any steps to protect them until it is too late." Joseph Medill, 2 DEBATES OF 
THE CoNSITrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 1666 (1870). See generally 
Sell and Fuge, "Impact of Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right 
of Cumulative Voting," 17 UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956); 43 A.L.R. (2d) 1322 (1955). 
It is possible that a cumulatively voting minority may elect a majority of the board of 
directors when the majority does not cumulate its votes or cumulates them improperly. 
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 150 (1883); Swartz v. State, 61 Ohio St. 497, 56 N.E. 
201 (1900); Chicago Macaroni Co. v. Boggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N.E. 17 (1903); State 
ex rel. Springs v. Ellison, 106 S.C. 139, 90 S.E. 699 (1916). See generally Cole, "Legal and 
Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting," 2 S.C. L.Q. 225 (1950); Bowes and De Bow, 
"Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations,'' 21 MINN. L. R.Ev. 351 
(1937). However, legislation requiring notice of intention to cumulate would make a 
minority controlled board unlikely. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1956) 
§1701.55. 
15 Wright v. Central Calif. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 P. 70 (1885) (resolution 
authorizing the election of only one director at each election held unconstitutional); 
Tomlin v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893) (resolution providing 
for election of directors by majority of shares held unconstitutional); People v. Deneen, 
247 Ill. 289, 93 N.E. 437 (1910) (statute authorizing political party to reduce number 
of candidates to be nominated held unconstitutional in view of elector's right to cumulate 
his votes). But see People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 333 Ill. 606, 165 N.E. 217 (1929). 
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states,16 and in the statutes of seven.17 The permissive provision 
required that the corporation provide for cumulative voting in the 
charter or by-laws before the shareholder could cumulate his 
votes.18 Such a provision is included in the statutes of eighteen 
states,19 but no state has a permissive provision in its constitution. 
Ten states make no provision for cumulative voting.20 
Classification of the board of directors had its origin in the states' 
attempts to attract prospective incorporators21 by providing for 
continuity of management in corporate boards.22 The statutes of 
16 Aruz. CoNsr., art. 14, §10; IDAHO CoNsr., art. II, §4; ILL. CoNsr., art. 11, §3; KY. 
CoNST., §207; MISS. CoNsr., art. 7, §194; Mo. CoNsr., art. II, §6; MoNT. CoNsr., art. 15, 
§4; NEB. CONST., art. 12, §5; N.D. CoNsr., art. 7, §135; PA. CoNsr., art. 16, §4; s.c. CoNsr., 
art 9, §11; S.D. CoNsr., art. 17, §5; W. VA. CoNsr., art. 11, §4. 
17 Ark. Stat. (1947) §64-224; Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (1953) §2235; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
(Corrick, 1949) §17-3303; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.32; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 
Supp. 1956) §1701.55; Wash. Rev. Code §23.32.070; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §44-109. 
18 It is unlikely that such a provision would find its way into a corporate charter at 
the time of incorporation, since it would lessen the promoters' control .over the corporate 
enterprise. Steadman and Gibson, "Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Manda-
tory?-A Debate," 11 BusINESS LAWYER, No. I, p. 9 (1955). Moreover, if cumulative voting 
is only permitted by statute, the privilege can be taken away by an authority equal to 
that which granted it. A majority of the shareholders can amend the charter to eliminate 
cumulative voting over the objection of the minority. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 
Del. Ch. 39, 147 A. 255 (1929); Quilliam v. Hebbronville Utilities, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 
241 S.W. (2d) 225. Cf. Loewenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 A. 454 
(1894) (where the by-law providing for cumulative voting was held part of the contract 
between the original incorporators and therefore not subject to amendment except as 
provided in the by-law). The state can repeal the cumulative voting statute under a 
reserved power to alter, amend or revoke over the objection of the corporation. Curran, 
"Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MICH. L. REv. 
743 (1934). 
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-2-4; Del.. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §214; Ind. Stat. 
Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1955) §§25-207, 25-223; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 12, §32; Md. Code 
Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 23, §39 (3); Minn. Stat. (1953) §301.26; Nev. Comp. Laws (1957) 
§78.360; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §14:10-15; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §51-6-6; 58 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951) §49; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §55-110; Okla. Stat. (1951) 
tit. 18, §1.68; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) §57.170; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 116, art. II, §23; 
Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §3741; 3A Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1956) art. 2.29; 
Vt. Stat. (1947) §5784; Va. Code (1956 rep!. vol.) §13.1-32. 
20 Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Utah, Wisconsin. In the absence of a cumulative voting provision in the constitu-
tion or statutes of the state of incorporation, it is to be doubted whether a shareholder 
would have the right to cumulate his votes in an election of directors. BALLENTINE, COR-
PORATIONS §177, p. 406 (1946). But see Campbell, "The Origin and Growth of Cumulative 
Voting for Directors," IO BusINESS LAWYER, No. 3, p. 10 (1955) where it is argued that 
the corporation may provide for cumulative voting under the broad statutory power to 
regulate its internal affairs or define the voting rights of shareholders. 
21 It is doubtful whether classification statutes were enacted primarily to limit cumu-
lative voting, since many states which have not insisted on cumulative voting have 
authorized classification. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 49 (1951). See 
also Shafer, "The Conflict of Cumulative Voting and Staggered Directorships," 24 UNIV. 
CIN. L. REv. 560 (1955). 
22 Compare Steadman and Gibson, "Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be 
Mandatory?-A Debate," 11 BUSINESS LAWYER, No. I, p. 9 (1955) (the affirmative view) 
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thirty-seven states23 make provision for classification. Included in 
this number are five24 of the seven states which guarantee cumu-
lative voting by statute, and eight25 of the thirteen states which 
guarantee the right by constitutional provision. It is with this 
latter group of states, guaranteeing cumulative voting by consti-
tution and providing for classification by statute, that this com-
ment will be concerned.26 
II. Constitutional Language 
None of the eight state constitutions which guarantee cumulative 
voting (and which provide for classification by statute) provide 
expressly that a shareholder shall be entitled to proportional repre-
sentation on the board,27 so the right must arise by implication if 
with Adkins, "Corporate Democracy and Classified Directors," 11 BUSINESS LA.WYER, No. 1, 
p. 31 (1955). 
23Ark. Stat. (1947) §64.403; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-2-2; Conn. Gen. Stat. 
(1949) §5165; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §141; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1956) §608.08; Ga. Code 
Ann. (Supp. 1955) §22-1868; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §157.35; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 
Supp. 1955) §25-208; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) '§17-3101; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) 
§271.345; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 12, §29; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 53, §32; Md. Code Ann. 
(Flack, 1951) art. 23, §48 (c); Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 156, .§22; Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1948) §450.13; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §351.315; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1955) §15-402; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1954) §21-115; Nev. Comp. Laws (1957) §78.115; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
(1955) c. 294, §89; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §14:7-3; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §51-2-14; 58 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951) §55; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §55-48; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) 
§10-0508; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1956) §1701.57; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 18, §1.35 (b); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) §57.190; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, §2852-403; R.I. Gen. 
Laws (1938) c. 116, art. II, §19; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §3744; 3A Tex. Civ. 
Stat. (Vernon, 1956) art. 2.33; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §16-2-24; Vt. Stat. (1947) §5779; 
Va. Code (1956 rep!. vol.) §13.1-36; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §23.36.030; W. Va. Code 
(1955) §3028. Three states require annual election of all directors. Ala. Code (1940) 
tit. 10, §22; Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (1953) §805; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §44-109. 
The statutes of seven states are in doubt as to whether annual elections are required. 
Ariz. Code Ann. (1956) §10-271; Idaho Code (1948) §30.133; Iowa Code (1954) §491.5; 
Minn. Stat. (1953) §301.28; Mississippi (no statute); South Carolina (no statute); S. D. 
Code (1939) §11.0701. 
24Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio and Washington. 
25 Illinois (prior to the Wolfson decision), Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. 
26 Where both classification and mandatory cumulative voting are provided for by 
statute (note 24 supra), the judicial inquiry will be on narrower grounds of statutory 
construction, and if both statutes are susceptible of a reasonable construction which will 
nullify neither, both devices will be upheld. See, e.g., Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 
Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E. (2d) 780 (1956), noted in 55 MICH. L. REv. 139 (1956), 31 ST. JOHNS 
L. REv. 126 (1956). See also 8 ALA. L. REv. 368 (1956); Stephan, "Cumulative Voting and 
Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wolfson v. Avery," 31 NOTRE DAME LA.WYER 351 
at 372 (1956) ("In those states in which cumulative voting is made mandatory or per-
missive by statute and classified boards are permissive the [Wolfson] decision should have 
no judicial repercussions at all. In such states the legislatures have seen fit to give share-
holders a right that is conditioned at its birth by the classification device."). 
27 Among the states where both mandatory cumulative voting and classification are 
provided for by statute (note 24 supra), only the Washington statute refers expressly to 
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at all.28 The Illinois court in Wolfson found such an implied right; 
the Pennsylvania court in Janney did not. It is possible to distin-
guish the cases on the basis of the different constitutional language 
involved in each. The Illinois Constitution,29 in providing that 
the shareholder's votes should be cast for "directors or managers 
to be elected" and for the "number of directors," required that 
all directors be elected at each election, while the Pennsylvania 
Constitution,30 in referring to "candidates" instead of "directors," 
contemplated that less than all the directors might be standing for 
election at one time. The court in Janney drew this distinction31 
to avoid the Wolfson holding.32 Even in Wolfson., it was argued 
by defendant corporation that the phrase "directors or managers 
to be elected" contemplated that less than all the directors might 
be standing for election at one time, and that therefore the consti-
tutional framers could not have intended strictly proportional 
representation on the board. The Illinois court, in rejecting this 
argument, concluded that the phrase "to be elected" referred only 
to the possibility that the size of the board might be changed be-
tween elections.38 It is submitted that the ambiguous nature of 
proportional representation: "Proportional method of representation. In the election 
of directors, every shareholder of record shall have the right to multiply the number of 
votes to which he may be entitled ... by the number of directors to be elected, and he 
may cast all such votes for one candidate or he may distribute them among any two 
or more candidates." Wash. Rev. Code §23.32.070. 
28 Necessary inference or implication can rule an act unconstitutional even though 
no express constitutional prohibition exists. See generally Sell and Fuge, "Impact of 
Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting," 17 
UNIV. PITI. L. REV. 151 at 165 (1956). 
20 The constitutions of Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska and West Virginia 
provide for cumulative voting in substantially the same language as the Illinois Constitu-
tion, note 3 supra. 
80 The North Dakota Constitution provides for cumulative voting in the same lan-
guage as the Pennsylvania Constitution, note 3 supra. 
31 "Whether [the Wolfson decision] be right or wrong, it distinguishes the case from 
the present one because the language in our own Constitution is different in that it 
makes no such reference to "directors" as determining the number of cumulative votes 
to which each stockholder is entitled." 387 Pa. 282 at 290. 
32 Prior to the Wolfson decision, there were only two cases which discussed the 
effect of classification on cumulative voting. Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 PITI. L. J. 
464 (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 1944); Cohen v. Byers Co., (Court of 
Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 1950) affd. per curiam 363 Pa. 618, 70 A. (2d) 837 
(1950) (affirmed on other than constitutional grounds). 
88 The court was aided in its in'terpretation by another section of the Illinois Consti-
tution which provided in identical language for cumulative voting in elections of General 
Assembly representatives, and stated further that three representatives would be elected 
every two years. The court reasoned that since the number of directors and the frequency 
of their election was specifically stated, the phrase "to be elected" could not refer to 
those facts without being surplusage. See generally COOLEY, CONsrrnJTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 
8th ed., 128-129 (1927). 
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both constitutional provisions justifies resort to extrinsic evidence 
to determine whether the constitutional framers intended that a 
shareholder would have the right to proportional representation on 
the board.34 
III. Extrinsic Evidence of Intent 
The most significant extrinsic evidence of intent is the fact that 
classification of corporate directors had been authorized by state 
legislatures and practiced by corporations before cumulative vot-
ing was provided for by constitution.35 It is arguable that had the 
constitutional framers intended to alter an existing business prac-
tice by requiring strictly proportional representation, they would 
have done so expressly.36 But the constitutional debates on cumu-
lative voting contain no reference to classification and little lan-
guage that can be construed as requiring strictly proportional rep-
resentation.37 Rather, the debates indicate that the evil intended 
to be remedied by cumulative voting was non-representation, not 
disproportionate representation.38 Also significant is the fact that, 
in both Illinois and Pennsylvania, legislatures subsequent to the 
constitutional convention enacted business corporation laws that 
provided for classification, and such enactments are evidence that 
34 Resort to extrinsic evidence should be made only to resolve patent ambiguities in 
constitutional or statutory language, COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 92 
(1927). However, the Pennsylvania court in Janney found the constitutional language 
"clear and unambiguous" but also considered extrinsic evidence of intent. 387 Pa. 282 
at 288. 
35 Classification of directors had been practiced in Pennsylvania prior to the adoption 
of the cumulative voting provision. See generally Sell and Fuge, "Impact of Classified 
Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting," 17 UNIV. 
Prrr. L. REv. 151 at 161 (1956). In Illinois, prior to the adoption of cumulative voting 
in the Constitution of 1870, at least 124 corporations organized by special act of the 
Illinois General Assembly had classified boards. Wolfson v. Avery, Brief for Appellants 
(Supreme Court) appendix A. 
36 "There is no inconsistency between cumulative voting and classification, unless 
cumulative voting means proportional representation. If it should mean that, it is for 
the legislatures to say so in more specific language than they have heretofore used." 
Adkins, "Corporate Democracy and Classified Directors," 11 Bus1NESS LAWYER, No. 1, 
p. 38 (1955). 
37 For an extensive analysis of the constitutional debates on cumulative votiµg in 
Illinois, Pennsylvania and other states, see WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 
20 (1951). 
38 See, e.g., 2 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
1666 (1870) ("I want at least a minority representation in the board of control, and that 
is all that is sought here"); 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND TIIE CONSTITUTION 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 605 (1872) ("A private contract or understanding, by which the affairs 
of the corporation are managed directly to the interest of an individual or a combination 
of individuals, is almost always secret. The great mass of the stockholders at the time 
the arrangement is made know nothing about it."). See generally 50 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 
112 (1955). 
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the legislators saw no conflict between mandatory cumulative vot-
ing and classification.39 Even subsequent to the adoption of the 
cumulative voting right, the effective exercise of that right could 
be limited by corporate action reducing the size of the board40 or 
providing for the removal of a director by majority vote of the 
shareholders,41 thereby making.it more difficult for the cumulative-
ly voting shareholder to secure or retain representation on the 
board. It is submitted that the extrinsic evidence of intent justifies 
the conclusion that constitutional cumulative voting provisions 
were not intended to assure the shareholder proportional represen-
tation on the board. 
IV. Conclusion 
In view of the ambiguous language of constitutional cumulative 
voting provisions, and the absence of substantial extrinsic evidence 
that the constitutional framers intended proportional representa-
ion, it is believed that there is no necessary inconsistency between 
such provisions and classification of the board.42 Unless classifica-
tion completely eliminates minority rights,43 a sufficiently large 
39 A contemporaneous legislative exposition of a constitution is entitled to great weight 
in determining the meaning of the constitutional provisions. Cohen v. Commonwealth, 
6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 (1821). 
40 Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y.S. 425 (1910), affd. 
per curiam 210 N.Y. 587, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914). But see Curran, "Minority Stockholders 
and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MICH. L. REv. 743 (1934). Statutes of 
California and Michigan would prohibit such reduction when a substantial minority 
objects. Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (1953) §501 (providing that the number of directors 
cannot be reduced below five without the consent of more than 80% of the voting power; 
the dissenting 20% would be able to elect cumulatively one director on a board of five); 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.13 (preventing reduction of the number of directots 
where the dissenting minority would not be able to elect cumulatively the same number 
of directors on the reduced board). 
41 Where the corporation has provided for cumulative voting, however, it is doubtful 
whether a minority director could be removed without cause. Matter of Rogers Imports, 
202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 106 (1952), noted in 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 744 (1953) (an 
amendment to the certificate of incorporation providing for cumulative voting invalidated 
a previous by-law authorizing removal of a director without cause by a majority of the 
stock). Statutes sometimes prevent removal of a director where the removal is opposed 
by a number of share votes sufficient for his election. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 
§450.13. 
42 The MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS Acr §§31, 35 (1950) provides for both manda-
tory cumulative voting and classification of directors. 
43 The cumulative voting right would be entirely negated where the corporation 
provided for only one director in each class. Compare Wright v. Central Calif. Colony 
Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 P. 70 (1885) (resolution authorizing the election of only one 
director at each election held unconstitutional) with Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio 
St. 45, 133 N.E. (2d) 780 (1956) (amendment to articles providing for election of only 
one director at each election held not inconsistent with statutory cumulative voting right). 
Such corporate action is unlikely in view of classification statutes which commonly require 
a minimum number of directors in each class. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 
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minority has the opportunity to secure representation even on a 
classified board.44 Such an opportunity, and not proportional rep-
resentation, was the intended object of constitutional cumulative 
voting provisions.45 
William R. Luney, S.Ed. 
1956) §1701.57 (enacted after the Humphrys decision to require a minimum of three 
directors in each class). 
44 In Wolfson, a minority holding 25% of the shares plus one share could elect one 
director in a three director (of nine) election. In Janney, a minority holding approxi-
mately 11% of the shares could elect one director in an eight director (of sixteen) elec-
tion. See note 4 supra. 
45 Democracy in the corporate sense is limited, as authority to manage the corpora-
tion is vested in the board, not the shareholders. Compare Garrett, "Attitudes on 
Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis," 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 310 (1956) with 
Shafer, "The Conflict of Cumulative Voting and Staggered Directorships," 24 UNIV. CIN. 
L. REv. 560 at 572 (1955). 
